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Ross Garnaut
Global 
Development  
I am glad to be here at Victoria University of Wellington 
giving this lecture in honour of Professor Sir Frank Holmes. 
Frank hosted my first visit to New Zealand 40 years ago, 
when, with Les Castle, he organised an early conference in the 
Pacific Trade and Development series that continues today. 
Four years later he was the leader of the New Zealand group 
that joined John Crawford, Peter Drysdale, Stuart Harris 
and me at the Pacific Community Seminar at the Australian 
National University, a precursor of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, and therefore a forebear of APEC. 
Frank made large contributions to the establishment and 
extension of closer economic relations between Australia and 
New Zealand in the 1980s 
through to the early years 
of this century. I discussed 
Asia–Pacific cooperation with 
Frank on many occasions 
in Australia, New Zealand 
and elsewhere in the Asia 
–Pacific. Frank was more 
comfortable with preferential 
trade than I ever became, and 
we learned about another 
view from each other. We 
can all be grateful for Frank’s 
contribution to ensuring 
that New Zealand was a 
participant in the deepening 
of Asia–Pacific economic 
integration through the last 
quarter of the 20th into the 
current century. 
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Global Development in the Twenty-first Century
In a different field, I remember extensive 
discussions with Frank about currency 
union with Australia around the turn 
of the century. Our host institution this 
evening, then the Institute of Policy 
Studies at Victoria, had just published 
his book with Arthur Grimes and Roger 
Bowden, An ANZAC Dollar (Holmes, 
Grimes and Bowden, 2000). This took 
Frank back to his 1950s roots in public 
policy, working on money and banking. 
His proposal for currency union with 
Australia was dismissed too swiftly by 
leaders of Australian policy institutions 
that then were justifiably pleased at having 
avoided recession through a few turbulent 
years in the Asia–Pacific economies when 
New Zealand had twice succumbed. 
New Zealand was to have one more 
recession avoided by Australia, in the 
aftermath of the great crash of 2008. It 
is now riding higher, as my own country 
grapples with the end of the China 
resources boom. Macroeconomic stability 
is an elusive goal for a small economy 
with strong export specialisation in 
commodities, and I fear that New 
Zealand’s medium-term future will 
not be as comfortable as the present. 
New Zealand has felt more bumps than 
Australia since the deep recessions of 
1991–92, but Australia is currently feeling 
a bigger bump. There may come a time 
for Australians and New Zealanders to 
consider with more open minds the 
merits of being part of a bit bigger (for 
Australia) or substantially bigger (for 
New Zealand) currency area, joining 
two neighbouring countries of modest 
size with integrated labour and financial 
markets, free and intense bilateral trade 
and overlapping cycles in terms of trade. 
The recent experience of the European 
monetary union would push us towards 
more systematic analysis of stabilising 
fiscal policy as preparation for monetary 
union. That would be no bad thing. 
Frank Holmes was a New Zealand 
leader of what my recent book, Dog 
Days: Australia after the Boom, calls 
the independent centre of the polity 
(Garnaut, 2013). He saw great value in 
careful and transparent analysis of the 
public interest, separate from any vested 
or partisan political interest. The success 
of public policy in any democracy in these 
troubled times depends on the strength 
of a strong independent centre. 
Younger people here this evening may 
need reminding of how natural it is to 
raise the big issues in global development 
in New Zealand. Just 50 or so metres from 
here, in the Cabinet room of the Old 
Government Buildings we are reminded 
of the contributions of the New Zealand 
governments of the late 19th and early 
20th centuries to ideas that were then at 
the frontier of thinking about developed 
countries. We are reminded of William 
Pember Reeves, who took knowledge from 
that Cabinet room into his influential 
foundational directorship of the London 
School of Economics (Reeves, 1902). A 
couple of decades later a young refugee 
from continental Europe’s capitulation 
to Nazism, Karl Popper, found in New 
Zealand the place to write one of the 
most compelling and important books 
on political philosophy to emerge from 
the last century (Popper, 1945). And I 
would include in the great New Zealand 
contributions to understanding modern 
global development J.B. Condliffe’s 
brilliant and authoritative The Commerce 
of Nations, written to provide guidance 
from the history of economic thought and 
economics to an unsettled world after the 
Second World War (Condliffe, 1951).
Modern economic growth and its maturation
Tonight I am going to argue that there is 
some prospect that the 21st century will 
see most of humanity living at material 
standards that are broadly comparable 
with those of the developed countries. 
I call that the maturation of modern 
economic growth. I see the maturation 
of modern economic growth as the only 
stable end-point of the process that began 
in Britain a quarter of a millennium ago. 
Any outcome short of that is not a resting 
place, but a point of disequilibrium and 
disruption. We do not know to what 
heights the increase in productivity and 
living standards will take the developed 
countries from now on, but whatever 
they may be, the maturation of economic 
growth will involve most of humanity 
living at that level.
I will provide some evidence this 
evening that capital may become much 
more abundant and labour much 
more scarce through the 21st century, 
supporting the maturation of global 
development. The same forces – abundant 
capital and scarce labour – that support 
rapid growth in living standards in the 
developing countries will make it possible 
to secure relatively equitable distribution 
of income in the world as a whole and 
eventually in each of its parts. 
But the maturation of global 
development has to climb over some 
daunting barriers. This evening I briefly 
discuss three barriers that at this stage 
seem to be particularly challenging: the 
reconciliation of much higher average 
living standards with the maintenance 
of the reasonable climate stability that is 
necessary for the continuation of global 
economic growth; the avoidance of 
economic development success in parts 
of the world being overwhelmed by 
development failure elsewhere; and the 
maintenance of effective government in 
the public interest in high-income market 
economies as wealthier private interests 
become less inhibited and more effective 
in influencing policy. My treatment of the 
barriers is necessarily brief, so that I do 
little more than highlight critical issues for 
continuing research.
... I am going to argue that there is 
some prospect that the 21st century will 
see most of humanity living at material 
standards that are broadly comparable 
with those of the developed countries. 
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Modern economic growth is young. 
We are still learning how it works. Modern 
economic growth is disturbing and 
painful. It does not take root anywhere 
until there is a widely shared view within 
the society that the benefits are worth the 
pain. It changes beliefs as well as political 
and social relationships and institutions. 
It puts down the mighty from their seats 
and elevates new elites. It enhances the 
power of states in the territories of which 
it has taken deep roots, and disturbs the 
international political order. 
Modern economic growth is 
beneficent. In countries which have 
enjoyed its fruits for many generations it 
raises the material comfort, knowledge, 
health, longevity, and capacity for 
communication across humanity of 
most ordinary citizens to levels unknown 
to the elites of earlier times. Modern 
economic growth is restless. It never stays 
on one course for long, disturbing what 
we thought we knew about it with each 
new turn, and providing great challenges 
for every generation. Condliffe’s account 
of modern economic development from 
Adam Smith to the Second World War is a 
story of events shaping and changing the 
nature of global development generation 
by generation (Condliffe, 1951). 
The challenges of modern economic 
development are more than usually 
difficult in the early 21st century. Gone 
is a contemporary basis for what had 
become a presumption in the developed 
countries, that the majority of people 
in each new generation would enjoy 
higher living standards than those in any 
generation that had lived before. Gone is 
any basis for assuming that our democratic 
institutions are easily reconciled with the 
effective operation of a market economy; 
and that only democracies are able to 
ride modern economic growth to high 
standards of living. And now, with 
anthropogenic climate change, we see 
more clearly than ever before that failure 
to change the composition of growth to 
take account of external environmental 
costs of private decisions will disrupt the 
beneficent process.
Three groups of countries
Obviously every country is unique, but we 
have to think in broader categories if we 
are to make sense of the world as a whole. 
I find it useful to think about three groups 
of countries: developed, developing 
and underdeveloped. In the developed 
countries, almost a billion people enjoy 
the high living standards that come from 
full absorption of the benefits and effects 
of modern economic growth. For all our 
problems, the developed countries of 
2015 are good places to be. I will argue 
this evening that China is heading rapidly 
towards a place among the developed 
countries, so we will soon be talking 
about roughly a third of humanity’s seven 
billion members, with a majority of them 
in China. In the developed countries 
excluding China, average output and 
expenditure (the mean of the domestic 
distribution) has been moving upwards at 
a snail’s pace in the 21st century; and the 
average for ordinary people (the median) 
is no longer moving up at all.
The developing countries (without 
China) contain over half of the world’s 
people, with most in South and South 
East Asia and a majority of the rest in 
Latin America. These have placed their 
feet on one or other of the multiple 
escalators of modern economic 
development and are moving towards 
the income levels and material standards 
of living of the developed countries at 
varying rates. Most countries that get on 
an escalator keep moving, but at different 
paces and with occasional jerks in the 
machinery – sometimes with a stalling of 
the mechanism for a few years or even a 
decade.  
And then there are the underdeveloped 
countries, which have not put their feet 
on an escalator. In the underdeveloped 
countries, on average there was hardly 
any growth in living standards over 
the last quarter of the last century. The 
average is looking a bit stronger in the 
21st century so far. Here we are talking 
of around a seventh of humanity. We 
find useful insights into this part of the 
human development experience in Paul 
Collier’s book The Bottom Billion (2007). 
Most of the bottom billion are in Africa. 
Increasing numbers are in the immediate 
region of Australia and New Zealand.
Challenges in the developed countries
The central challenge arises from the 
stagnation in living standards for all but 
the rich in all the substantially-developed 
countries since the great crash of 2008. In 
the United States, average living standards 
of people at the median of the income 
distribution are no higher, and perhaps 
lower, now than three decades ago. The 
cessation of growth in living standards for 
ordinary people has several interrelated 
sources. One is a historic slowing of 
productivity growth in the 21st century. 
A second is the demographic change 
that follows from the combination of 
increased life expectancy and fertility 
below population-replacement levels that 
is present in all the developed countries. 
Ageing seems to reduce capacity for 
innovation, and to reduce incentives to 
invest. A third, influenced by the first two, 
is a tendency for private savings to run 
ahead of investment, causing employment 
to fall more rapidly than the labour force. 
A fourth is the effect of globalisation 
of production of a wider and wider 
range of economic activities, and of the 
deployment of capital. Globalisation has 
been helpful to the increase in developed-
country as well as global production, 
while transferring income from labour 
in the developed to the developing 
In the United States, average living 
standards of people at the median of the 
income distribution are no higher, and 
perhaps lower, now than three decades 
ago.
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countries and of resources from the 
public revenues to the owners of capital. A 
fifth is a weakening of redistributive fiscal 
interventions to moderate the inequality 
of incomes and wealth that emerges from 
market exchange. 
While there are differences across 
developed countries and time in the 
widening of income inequality and the 
slowdown in economic growth, the 
similarities are more powerful than the 
differences in the 21st century so far. 
China is different, as it completes the 
‘catch-up’ with the productivity levels 
and living standards of the established 
developed countries, but it will be subject 
to similar pressures and constraints once 
it is there.  
A closer look at productivity growth in the 
developed countries
Productivity growth in the developed 
countries at the frontiers of modern 
economic activity has been proceeding less 
rapidly since 2000 than at any time since the 
early days of modern economic development 
a quarter of a millennium ago. This has been 
the subject of considerable discussion in 
the economic literature. One famous paper 
has suggested that we may not see again the 
rises in productivity and therefore of living 
standards of earlier periods of modern 
economic development (Gordon, 2012).  
In Australia, New Zealand and 
other English-speaking countries, as 
well as Spain, the consequences of low 
productivity growth were masked for a 
while by an extraordinary housing and 
consumption boom from the turn of the 
century to the great crash of 2008. That 
was unsustainable. It was funded by our 
banks borrowing abroad in wholesale 
markets. It came to an end in cataclysm 
in the large developed countries. The 
great crash didn’t end badly in Australia, 
and led to recession but not cataclysm 
in New Zealand. The better end in the 
Tasman neighbours was partly a result 
of quick-footed policy, but that policy 
was only viable because of Australians’ 
special fortune in being beneficiaries of 
the Chinese economic response to the 
crash (Garnaut, 2013). New Zealand 
benefited as well from Australia’s fiscal 
and monetary expansion.  
China’s resources boom postponed 
the effects of declining productivity on 
Australian living standards until China’s 
pattern of growth changed again from 
about 2011. A new Chinese model of 
growth emphasised greater equity in 
income distribution and reduced pressure 
on the natural environment.   
There are many things we do not 
understand about the marked slowing 
of productivity growth in the developed 
countries. There is even a question of 
whether we are measuring productivity 
properly. Over recent years and decades 
we have been introduced to new 
commodities and new services that greatly 
improve the quality of life, without those 
qualitative factors being influential in the 
productivity statistics.
A closer look at low real interest rates and 
deficient demand
Nevertheless, measured well or poorly, 
the reality of low and – in the case of 
Australia, since 2005 – negative total factor 
productivity growth of the traditional 
kind has reduced incentives for business 
investment. Levels of business investment 
in all of the developed countries have been 
low this century, and especially since the 
crash of 2008. This has placed downward 
pressure on employment. All developed 
countries have experienced since the great 
crash a combination of rising savings and 
lower business investment, and therefore a 
tendency towards reduced demand, higher 
unemployment and lower economic 
growth. This has been responsible for part 
of the widening of inequality.
One consequence of higher savings 
and lower investment is lower interest 
rates. Low official interest rates have 
been reinforced by ‘quantitative easing’ 
in, at various times, Britain, continental 
Europe, Japan and the United States, 
where central banks are providing assets 
that can be turned into cash as they buy 
back government bonds from the private 
sector. Quantitative easing has been 
putting more money into the community 
with a view to reducing interest rates and 
encouraging business activity.
There is a fair bit of evidence that 
low official short-term interest rates 
and quantitative easing are a temporary 
and minor part of a bigger story: that 
we have entered a world in which long-
term interest rates are much lower on 
an ongoing basis than they used to be. 
The most commonly traded long-term 
government security in most countries 
is a ten-year bond. The interest rates on 
ten-year bonds are lower in real terms 
than they have ever been in almost all of 
the developed countries. On Friday 20 
February 2015, when I was preparing this 
text, the nominal ten-year bond rate was 
2.11% in the US; 1.76% in the UK; 0.36% 
in Germany; 0.39% in Japan; 2.57% in 
Australia; and 3.32% in New Zealand. 
That is the rate, before deducting inflation, 
at which the private sector is prepared to 
lend to government on a ten-year basis. 
The average in real terms weighted by 
size of economy is around zero. We have 
not been in this territory before. 
A closer look shows that we were 
heading into this unusual territory before 
the financial crisis. There is reason to 
doubt whether quantitative easing has 
had a large influence on long-term 
interest rates. Recently we saw long-term 
bond rates fall in the United States as 
the Federal Reserve brought quantitative 
easing to an end. This suggests to me that 
extraordinarily low contemporary short-
term rates reflect perceptions that there 
has been a permanent lift in the volume 
Globalisation has been helpful to the 
increase in developed-country as well 
as global production, while transferring 
income from labour in the developed to 
the developing countries ... 
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of long-term savings relative to long-term 
investment.  
The one certain economic 
consequence of quantitative easing has 
been to promote capital outflow and a 
lower exchange rate in the countries in 
which it has been applied.
To illustrate how unusual today’s real 
long-term interest rates are compared 
with anything that has come before 
I am taking two graphs from a paper 
presented in February 2015 by the Bank 
of England’s chief economist (Haldane, 
2015). Figure 1 presents data on nominal 
sovereign bond rates back to the days 
when Elizabeth I was raising funds to 
defend the realm against the Spanish 
Armada. Figure 2 reveals the distinctive 
nature of the contemporary real interest 
rates: near zero.
Being in a world of near-zero real 
interest rates has large consequences. One 
is a potentially favourable influence on the 
distribution of income within societies. 
The celebrated recent book by the French 
economist Thomas Piketty, Capital in 
the Twenty-first Century (2014) has 
been widely read and discussed in New 
Zealand, as it has elsewhere (Bertram, 
2014, 2015). It has been the best-selling 
economics book of our time – for the 
first couple of years after publication, the 
best-selling economics book ever. Piketty 
argues that we are heading towards a 
world of widening inequality in income 
distribution because the rate of interest is 
going to exceed the rate of growth. Those 
who already own a large amount of capital 
will be accumulating it at a high interest 
rate. He presents much historical data 
which shows a tendency for rates of return 
on low-risk investment, like government 
bonds or land, to be around 4–5% in 
real terms, right back to the 18th century. 
Piketty asserts that real returns on low-risk 
long-term assets will remain near those 
levels. With rates of growth (and he has in 
mind mainly rates of growth in developed 
countries) falling below that level, it 
follows that we will see inequality growing 
wider and wider. There is no logical reason 
why inequality will not come to equal and 
exceed that of the Belle Époque in Europe 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
That view puts Piketty at odds with 
the greatest public intellectual of the 20th 
century. John Maynard Keynes argued 
that we could expect negligibly low 
returns on investment in the long-term 
future – a century forward from when he 
was writing in the 1930s (Keynes, 1931, 
1936).
Piketty’s challenging analysis is right 
in drawing attention to large increases in 
inequality in the distribution of income 
and wealth in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. It is right in drawing attention 
to the need for international cooperation 
in the taxation of capital if these 
tendencies are to be corrected without 
political disruption in the democracies. 
It is right as well in drawing attention 
to the increasing role of capital in the 
policy-making process in the developed 
democracies, which is weakening the 
effectiveness of fiscal interventions that 
moderated income inequality in the 
developed economies in the golden 
quarter-century after the Second World 
War. But recent developments in global 
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capital markets suggest to me that 
Keynes is right and Piketty wrong on 
the particular question that will be most 
important in shaping global development 
in the 21st century. 
Keynes expects people, and especially 
the wealthy, to save a substantial 
proportion of their incomes in future as 
they have in the past. So, he says, if we 
do not make a mess of modern economic 
development with war or unnecessary 
depressions – and he wrote The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace (1919) to 
show us how to avoid the former and 
The General Theory (1936) the latter – 
then the long-term future for the global 
economy is one of abundance of output 
and capital. The abundance will cause 
the rate of return on capital to fall to low 
levels. People who have a lot of capital 
will not have enormous incomes simply 
as a result of that ownership. This world 
will see ‘the euthanasia of the rentier’. For 
those who are interested in access to the 
important things of life there will be an 
abundance, so that questions of inequality 
will not matter very much. 
I can’t avoid noting that Keynes 
invented the important concept of 
‘positional goods’, which in their nature 
are available only to some. Keynes’ 
personal list of the things that were 
important would have included access 
to the London Opera, Russian ballet 
and French champagne, which, in their 
nature, are available in limited supply. 
For personal access to these, he may have 
had to rely on the tastes of most of the 
population being different from his own. 
Keynes’ world is almost the opposite 
of the world that Piketty anticipates in 
his book. 
If Keynes was right and Piketty wrong 
on this one big question, why did inequality 
increase so much in the 21st century to date, 
as rates of return fell? Because rates of return 
did not fall if we include capital gains, as 
Picketty does, with good reason. But much 
of the increase in wealth and income at the 
top of the distribution in this century so 
far that is reasonably measured by Picketty 
reflects once-and-for-all increases in asset 
values associated in one way or another 
with the decline in interest rates themselves.
Low interest rates have helped to lift 
investment and growth in employment 
and output, but have not increased them 
enough to achieve anything like full 
employment. Governments have been 
reluctant to expand expenditure funded by 
borrowing in response to weak domestic 
demand, despite the unprecedentedly 
low costs of borrowing. This is partly 
motivated by concern over long-term 
problems of servicing government debt 
– a real concern for highly indebted 
countries if there are reasonable prospects 
of a return to higher interest rates or to 
difficulties in borrowing abroad. To the 
extent that weak domestic demand is 
the product of high savings associated 
with ageing and population decline, it 
is prudent for governments to limit the 
increase in indebtedness, except where 
debt raises future incomes and capacity 
to service debt. This has focused attention 
on public investment in productivity-
raising infrastructure at home, and 
income-earning investment in public 
infrastructure abroad. Public investment 
abroad to raise domestic demand and 
employment is especially important in 
countries experiencing population decline, 
where the opportunities for investment 
in income-generating infrastructure at 
home are more limited.
Capital outflow to income-generating 
infrastructure investment in developing 
countries can therefore be helpful to 
maintaining growth in employment 
and output in the developed countries. 
It goes along with low real exchange 
rates and high net exports. It is a point 
of high complementarity between 
current requirements for prosperity 
in the developed countries, and the 
requirements for strong growth in the 
developing countries.
The developed country to watch most 
closely as an influence on capital flows 
from developed to developing countries 
from now on is China. China already has 
much larger savings in absolute terms 
than any developed country. Its savings, 
investment and capital flows are likely 
to dominate global totals in the 2020s at 
least as thoroughly as those of the United 
States immediately after the Second World 
War, or the United Kingdom immediately 
before the First World War. 
The developing countries
The average rates of growth in productivity 
and output have held up in the developing 
countries despite the fall from early in this 
century and the further step down with the 
great crash of 2008 in the developed countries. 
Figure 3 from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2014) tells the story. Developed-
country real purchasing power grew rapidly 
in the 1980s, but then eased back through 
the 1990s to the great crash. Growth since 
2008 has been at a crawl and is not expected 
to change trajectory in the foreseeable future. 
Figure 3: Global growth rates, developed and developing countries 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the marked change 
in the trajectory of developing relative to 
developed growth from the beginning of the 
21st century, growing wider from 2008. 
Developing Asia was the standout 
performer in the last quarter of the 20th 
century, nearly trebling output in the 
1980s (an increase in real purchasing 
power of 183.5%), easing a little in the 
1990s with the Asian financial crisis (an 
increase of 144% over the decade) and 
accelerating in the early 21st century 
(an increase of 129% in the eight years 
to the great crash of 2008). This is 
‘catch-up growth’ in full stride. Asian 
developing country growth performance 
was strongly influenced by China, but 
has held up despite the deceleration of 
Chinese growth since 2011 (an increase 
of 68% between 2008 and 2014). 
Latin American was slower than 
developed-country growth in the 1980s 
(an increase of 71.5% over the decade), but 
held up much better in the 1990s (67%). 
It accelerated in the early 21st century 
(an increase of 60% in the eight years to 
2008). It has eased since the great crash (an 
increase of 28% in the six years to 2014), 
having been knocked back more by the 
end of the China resources boom than by 
the stagnation in the developed world.
The ‘catch-up’ momentum has been 
especially powerful in the large Asian 
developing countries, most importantly, 
after China, India and Indonesia. India 
has almost matched China since 2011, 
and may soon do so. Indonesia restored 
strong growth impressively within a few 
years of the 1997–99 crisis and depression, 
and subsequent democratic transition. 
Most developing countries following 
export-oriented industrialisation strategies 
were held back to some extent by Chinese 
competition through the 1990s and early 
21st century. The new model of Chinese 
growth and associated increase in relative 
Chinese costs and withdrawal from global 
markets for labour-intensive goods, and the 
expansion of opportunities for developing 
countries for a wide range of goods and 
services in the China market itself, provide 
a highly favourable environment for growth 
in the developing countries, and especially 
in developing Asia. 
Unlike China, many of the rapidly grow-
ing Asian developing countries, including 
India and Indonesia, have experienced 
budget, and sometimes external payments, 
constraints on growth which have made it 
difficult to provide the infrastructure requir-
ed for rapid development. This highlights 
the complementarity between developed 
and developing country requirements for 
maintaining strong growth in employment 
and output in the period ahead.      
The underdeveloped countries
The bottom billion include all of Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s island neighbours in 
an arc of instability, intensifying poverty, 
high fertility and population growth, from 
Papua New Guinea to Fiji. Collier did not 
include Papua New Guinea in his bottom 
billion in 2007, and the persistence then of 
the struggle for good governance within 
the leadership justified his hesitation at 
that time. Regrettably, there is a Gresham’s 
law of corruption in a country with weak 
institutions. When the currency has been 
debased, bad money drives out good. The 
good is forced out of circulation until there 
has been transformational institutional 
change. 
My observations from experience of 
development in the island countries of the 
south-west Pacific correspond with those 
of Collier in Africa and support his main 
conclusions. Underdevelopment has its 
origins in problems of governance, which 
are far-reaching and intractable. Making 
headway on the problems of governance 
sets a path to development, but it is hard 
to get started. Democracy is often an 
illusion until institutional weaknesses have 
been removed by education and drawing 
on external institutions. The exploitation 
of valuable natural resources can 
temporarily create the statistical illusion 
of development, but is usually associated 
with kleptocratic capture of economic 
benefits by a small elite that can corrode 
established institutional strengths.
The magnitude of the challenge does 
not mean that progress is impossible – just 
difficult, requiring institutional stability, 
wisely directed institution-building over 
long periods, and often intrusive external 
support. A number of bottom billion 
African countries are making headway 
in the 21st century so far, including 
Ethiopia with large Chinese support 
for infrastructure and agricultural and 
industrial development.
The bottom billion are more 
important than their current numbers 
suggest because much higher fertility 
makes them a rapidly increasing 
proportion of humanity. We could be 
confident that the global population will 
be on a downward path within a few 
decades despite increasing longevity only 
if a large proportion of the bottom billion 
were headed towards entry into the ranks 
of the developing countries. 
International support for development 
in the bottom billion must take the 
form of transfers rather than income-
earning investments and be justified on 
development and security grounds. It 
can contribute to lower real exchange 
rates and net exports, and therefore to 
employment in the developed countries, 
but not to future income for an older 
population in the developed countries.
Whether humanity achieves 
the maturation of global economic 
development with all of its benefits for 
all of humanity depends on getting the 
A number of bottom billion African 
countries are making headway in 
the 21st century so far, including 
Ethiopia with large Chinese support 
for infrastructure and agricultural and 
industrial development.
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people of the underdeveloped countries 
onto the economic development escalator. 
That is a hard task. Omitted, we cannot 
even be certain that the proportion of 
people on earth enjoying high living 
standards will increase over time, even if 
countries like China and Indonesia and 
India are growing strongly. 
The good news is that the sub-Saharan 
African economic story is looking much 
stronger in the 21st century so far. Growth 
is proceeding rapidly in the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa – a majority of these 
countries – that are not experiencing 
extreme political disorder.  Real purchasing 
power more than doubled in sub-Saharan 
Africa between 2000 and 2008 and 
increased almost by half in the six years 
after that. High terms of trade from the 
China resources boom helped, but strong 
growth has survived the shift to the new 
model of economic growth in China. 
Bringing global development to maturation
I have outlined powerful forces favouring 
the maturation of global development 
in the 21st century, lined up against the 
three barriers to which I have drawn 
attention. Most importantly, the slower 
growth of population and labour force 
and the prospects of absolute decline later 
in this century, and the high and rising 
rate of global savings out of a growing 
world income hold out the prospect of 
persistently low costs of capital and high 
and rising incomes of ordinary people 
everywhere. These developments are 
favourable both for the rapid catching up 
of the developing and, should domestic 
conditions permit, underdeveloped 
countries, and for equitable distribution 
of the fruits of economic growth. They are 
reinforced by a tendency for technological 
change to be capital-augmenting in the 
early 21st century – the prices of capital 
goods are falling faster than those of 
consumer goods, so that a given amount 
of capital stretches further.
I will run through these favourable 
developments for the maturation of 
global economic growth, and then discuss 
the three barriers.   
Natural increase in population has 
ceased in the third of humanity in the 
developed countries including China. It 
is rapidly decelerating towards zero in 
the more than half of humanity in the 
developing countries. It is decelerating 
but remains high in the rapidly 
increasing seventh of humanity in the 
underdeveloped countries. Through a 
long transition to stable or declining 
world population, longer life expectancy 
can keep population growth positive 
for generations after fertility has fallen 
below replacement levels. But in the end 
it is fertility that drives long-term global 
population and labour force growth. 
Figure 4 tells the story of declining 
fertility. It is customary to think 
that fertility of about 2.1 represents 
replacement level. The true replacement 
rate falls with reduced female child 
mortality and rises with natal masculinity. 
Rising ratios of males to females at birth 
in China and South Asia in particular 
have been the dominant source of a 
decrease in the zero population growth 
level of fertility in recent years.
Figure 4: Levels of total fertility (births per woman), for the world and 
major areas, 1970 to 2015
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Figure 5: Secular trend in global savings rate
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Fertility in the developed regions of 
the world is now below replacement. It is 
falling rapidly towards replacement and 
can be expected relatively soon to fall to 
and below that level in the developing 
countries. It has fallen from about 6.7 
to 4.7 in Africa since 1970, but is still 
high enough there and in the rest of the 
bottom billion for the time being to hold 
fertility in the world as a whole well above 
replacement – about 2.6 at present. 
The experience of global development 
and demographic arithmetic tell us 
that continuation of early 21st-century 
economic success in Africa would see 
global fertility fall below replacement 
levels within a couple of decades. The 
global labour force would begin to fall 
not long after that, and global population 
reach its peak and begin to decline not 
long after the middle of the century. 
Figure 5, from a recent paper by Barry 
Eichengreen (2015), shows the tendency 
for global savings rates to rise over decades. 
Low labour force growth and high rates of 
increase in the stock of capital through 
rising savings are favourable both for rapid 
growth in average incomes and for falling 
inequality. Figure 6, also from Eichengreen, 
reveals a powerful tendency for the relative 
costs of capital goods to decline over 
time. This means that recent economic 
growth has been capital-augmenting, 
with the potential to facilitate rapid global 
economic growth and increases in the 
labour share of rising income.
How do we reconcile the presence of 
powerful forces promoting low returns to 
capital and increasing scarcity of labour 
and higher labour incomes in the world 
as a whole, with the tendency towards 
stagnant or declining standards of living 
and greater inequality in the developed 
countries to which Piketty has drawn 
attention, and which we have observed is 
a threat to democratic government? 
Reference has already been made to 
the once-and-for-all contribution made 
to increased inequality of wealth and 
income by falling interest rates in the 
early 21st century. Figure 7, prepared by 
two World Bank researchers (Lakner and 
Milanovic, 2013), helps us to understand 
the complex interaction of national 
and global developments. It focuses on 
the three decades up to the great crash 
of 2008, so misses the deterioration in 
median incomes and widening dispersion 
of incomes in developed countries since 
then. 
Over the three decades the dispersion 
of global incomes as measured by 
a global Gini coefficient narrowed 
slightly. There were huge variations in 
the increase in incomes for people at 
different places in the global distribution 
of income over the three decades. People 
near the middle of the distribution and 
right at the top did extremely well – the 
middle corresponding to workers in 
China and the rapidly growing Asian 
developing countries, the top to the 1% 
in developed countries to which Piketty 
draws attention and their counterparts all 
over the world. People around the 80th 
and 90th percentiles – well off on a world 
scale, corresponding to workers in the 
developed countries – did poorly, as did 
members of the bottom billion in the low 
percentiles of the chart.
So, at the global level, the recent 
pattern of development has favourable 
features: developing countries are growing 
strongly and catching up rapidly with the 
Figure 6: Secular trend in global savings rate
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Figure 7: Global growth incidence curve 1988 to 2008 
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developed; many in the bottom billion are 
showing signs of having joined modern 
economic development; and global 
income distribution is not becoming more 
unequal. There is a problem in developed 
countries of domestic demand being 
too weak to maintain full employment 
and high economic activity, but the best 
solution – investment abroad in income-
generating infrastructure with support 
from high net exports and a low real 
exchange rate – is closely complementary 
to what is required for growth to remain 
strong in developing countries. At the 
highest level of generality, humanity has 
reasonable prospects for the maturation 
of global development in the 21st 
century, with more equitable distribution 
of greatly increased global incomes.
Three barriers to maturation of global 
development
Let us return to the three barriers to the 
maturation of global development.
First, anthropogenic climate change. 
Established patterns of consumption 
and investment place great pressure on 
the environment. The pressure that is 
most likely to truncate modern economic 
development through the 21st century 
is anthropogenic climate change. At 
the most optimistic end of the range 
of possibilities defined by the science, 
the raising of average consumption and 
investment levels per person to those 
of the developed countries without 
radically reducing the carbon emissions 
intensity of economic activity would 
create serious headwinds for global 
development through the second half 
of the 21st century. More likely, steady 
progress towards the maturation of global 
development without large reductions 
in carbon intensity would change 
global temperatures, and therefore have 
consequences for other things, to an 
extent that was inconsistent with the 
domestic and international political 
stability upon which economic growth 
depends (Stern, 2007; Garnaut, 2008, 
2011; Christoff, 2013).
Radically reducing the carbon 
intensity of economic activity has a cost, 
which itself generates some headwind 
for global economic growth, especially 
in the early decades of the century. Early 
assessments suggested that the costs of 
reducing carbon intensity to levels that 
substantially reduced climate risks were 
of manageable dimension, especially 
if these were achieved through general 
and economy-wide interventions rather 
than through regulatory action (Cline, 
1992; Nordhaus, 1994, 2008; Stern, 2007; 
Garnaut, 2008, 2011).
Four developments point to 
substantially lower costs of mitigation 
of climate change than suggested by 
earlier assessments. First, a focus on 
energy efficiency has reduced quickly 
and considerably the amount of energy 
applied to each unit of economic activity. 
Electricity use has fallen significantly in 
recent years in all the established develop-
ed countries, and electricity intensity 
has fallen sharply in China. Second, the 
costs of new, low-carbon technologies are 
falling faster than anticipated, especially 
with large-scale production of capital 
goods in China and deployment in many 
countries. Third, study of health and 
other co-benefits of decarbonisation is 
strengthening commitment to reducing 
use of fossil fuels in the biggest users 
(Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate, 2014; Garnaut, 2014; 
Chen et al., 2013). Fourth, international 
cooperation on climate change mitigation 
has been strengthened as major countries 
have groped towards a more practical 
approach built around ‘concerted 
unilateral mitigation’ rather than an 
unrealistic search for comprehensive, 
legally binding agreements. 
We are a long way from being on a 
trajectory of emissions growth that is likely 
to be consistent with the continuation 
of modern economic growth in the 21st 
century. But we have travelled far enough 
along the path of reducing the emissions 
intensity of economic activity in recent 
years to be confident that the means are 
available to reconcile all of humanity 
having high standards of living with 
climate stability. The questions are about 
the capacity of domestic and international 
political systems to deploy policies that 
reconcile economic growth with the 
maintenance of the natural environment 
that sustains it. 
On inclusive development across 
the whole of humanity, as with climate 
change mitigation, recent developments 
are hopeful on an issue that has the 
potential to block the maturation of global 
development. The classical economists 
thought that sustained increases in living 
standards of ordinary people were unlikely 
because they would generate an increase 
in population that swamped the increase 
in production (Malthus, 1798, 1840; 
Ricardo, 1817). That was more or less 
how population and living standards had 
interacted through human history until 
the mid-19th century. The experience of 
modern economic growth has taught us 
that higher and more secure incomes and 
the greater self-confidence and education 
of women which accompany them lead 
to large reductions in fertility. That is 
followed, with a lag, by slower labour 
force growth and, all other things being 
equal, by increases in labour incomes. 
On the exclusion of the bottom billion 
and its effects on global population as 
a barrier to the maturation of global 
development in the 21st century, I once 
would have been as pessimistic as the 
The experience of modern economic 
growth has taught us that higher and 
more secure incomes and the greater 
self-confidence and education of women 
which accompany them lead to large 
reductions in fertility.
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classical economists. The awful arithmetic 
is that the size of the global labour force and 
population can continue to rise if a seventh 
and growing proportion of humanity 
continues to have high fertility, even if 
the developed and developing countries 
together have population decline. The 
recent success of economic growth and the 
early stages of declining fertility in much 
of sub-Saharan Africa gives the developed 
countries the chance to reinforce success 
with intelligent support. China’s immense 
increase in trade and investment in Africa 
is controversial. Overall, it seems to have 
been effective in reinforcing stronger 
economic performance (Johnston, 
forthcoming, 2015).
The special challenge for Australia 
and New Zealand is that some of the 
most intractable elements of the bottom 
billion are in our own neighbourhood, 
in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, 
Vanuatu and Fiji. It may be that the 
barrier to the maturation of modern 
economic development is removed in 
the decades ahead, while leaving a deep 
problem for our immediate region. We 
have a special responsibility in this region 
and to date have not handled it well. For 
the maturation of global development 
to be as beneficial for Australia and New 
Zealand as it is for the world as a whole, 
we will have to put much greater effort 
into understanding what is necessary to 
overcome the high barriers to participa-
tion in modern economic development 
in our own backyard.   
Concluding note on political systems
That leaves the central barrier to the 
maturation of global development: the 
restoration of effective economic policy 
in the public interest in the old developed 
countries, and its establishment in China 
as a developed country, which will be 
influential on the quality of government 
everywhere.
Some of the problems of developed 
countries since the great crash of 2008 
have been exacerbated by failure of 
economic analysis. These are the most 
easily corrected. The recent G20 heads 
of government meeting in Australia 
focused on promotion of higher levels of 
public investment in income-generating 
infrastructure – at home, where there 
is productive potential for it, and in 
successful developing countries. Effective 
investment abroad will improve the 
economic prospects of developed and 
developing countries alike. China has gone 
furthest in developing the institutions 
for large increases in international 
investment, but others may follow.
Modern economic growth and 
reconciling equity with growth both 
require effective government. Sustaining 
high productivity growth requires 
government to be strong enough to 
unwind anti-competitive arrangements 
that accumulate over time in any 
economy; to provide a wide range of 
public goods and to tax external costs of 
private decisions in order to reconcile the 
functioning of a market economy with 
continued growth in the public interest; 
and to run fiscal and monetary policy 
consistently with economic stability. And 
effective government is required to run tax 
and expenditure policies that constrain 
inequality in income distribution 
within limits that are consistent with 
political support for growth-sustaining 
policy. This is a huge challenge for the 
developed countries, and I can do no 
more than underline its importance in 
my concluding remarks. 
Larry Diamond has recently written 
about a ‘democratic recession’ since 2006 
in the world as a whole, driven partly 
by ‘the decline of democratic efficacy, 
energy, and self-confidence in the West’ 
(Diamond, 2015). He notes as integral 
parts of the problem the ever-increasing 
costs of election campaigns, and the 
surging roles of non-transparent money 
in politics. Contemporary democracy in 
developed countries is for the time being 
failing in a struggle against the weight 
of vested interests to implement policies 
that are necessary for the maintenance 
of established standards of living for 
ordinary people. 
Recent commentators on the role of 
vested interests in lowering the quality 
of economic policy in the public interest 
(Stiglitz, 2012; Krugman, 2003; Sachs, 
2012; Garnaut, 2013) have related the 
general phenomena highlighted by 
Diamond specifically to economic policy. 
These are not new concerns, having been 
voiced by economists who recognised the 
transformative benefits of democratic 
capitalism. Schumpeter in his classic 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
noted that the means at the disposal of 
private interests in a democracy ‘are often 
used to thwart the will of the people’, 
and ‘to interfere with the working of the 
mechanism of competitive leadership’ 
(Schumpeter, 1942). In the early post-
war period Condliffe cautioned that, ‘It 
is always dangerous to entrust the final 
decisions of social policy to those who 
stand to gain from an immediate course 
of action’ (Condliffe, 1951). What makes 
these concerns more immediate today 
is the more overt and less constrained 
interventions by vested interests in the 
developed countries’ policy-making 
process, their evident success in influencing 
policy in the early 21st century, and the 
associated decline in aggregate economic 
performance and the skewed distribution 
of incomes and wealth. 
For the developed countries, and 
clearly for my own country, the reform 
of democracy has to begin with tight 
and effective constraints on corporate, 
including trade union, funding of political 
campaigns and parties.
The problem of vested interests 
corrupting policy-making in the public 
interest is not confined to the democracies. 
The struggle of a new general secretary, Xi 
Jinping, to exclude corrupt influences on 
The problem of vested interests 
corrupting policy-making in the 
public interest is not confined to the 
democracies.
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policy has been a dominant political focus 
of the new party and state leadership that 
came to office in late 2012 and early 2013 
in China. The current Chinese leadership’s 
hopes are more easily exclaimed than 
implemented, and it would be surprising 
if they were straightforwardly successful. 
The contemporary association of developed 
countries with democracy will soon change 
if I am right about China joining the ranks 
of developed countries through the 2020s. 
Most of the world’s high-income people will 
then live in a country whose government 
professes to govern for the people, but 
avowedly not by the people. 
Whether humanity sees the maturation 
of modern economic development 
through the 21st century depends above all 
on whether we can find effective systems 
of government for the people through the 
21st century. Whether government by the 
people becomes dominant in the world, 
or is confined to a few places in which it 
put down deep roots a long time ago, will 
be determined over much the same time. 
The prospects for both the maturation of 
global economic growth and government 
by the people will be strongly influenced 
by the strength of the independent centre 
of the democratic developed countries, 
to which Frank Holmes contributed so 
much in New Zealand. 
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